Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables Alice (a transmitter) and Bob (a receiver) to share a key while keeping it secret from an eavesdropper (Eve), and thereby offers the promise of unconditional security [1, 2] . Since the first QKD protocol, known as BB84, was proposed in 1984 [3] , various QKD protocols have been proposed: such as, B92 [4], E91 [5] , differential phase shift [6] , coherent oneway [7] , and so on. BB84 [3] is the most widely-used QKD system; it uses two sets of non-orthogonal basis states of a single photon. Unconditional security of the BB84 protocol has been proven by many different techniques [8] [9] [10] [11] , but one of its key requirements is a single-photon source. However, a highly efficient single-photon source, suitable for quantum cryptography applications, does not currently exist [12] .
and s 4 = (|H〉, | − 45°〉). Alice randomly sends one of the two non-orthogonal polarization states in the randomly selected set; Bob uses either the Z basis or the X basis to measure the photon. After quantum communication is finished, Alice and Bob exchange the information of Alice's selected set and Bob's measuring basis. Thus, quantum communication in SARG04 is identical to the BB84 protocol; only the classical key sifting procedure is modified. At that time, SARG04 is secure for two-photon pulses. For example, if Alice sends |V〉 with two-photon pulses and reveals s 1 = (|V〉, |45°〉), then Eve gets |V〉 by the Z basis and measures |45°〉 or | − 45°〉 with 50% probability by the X basis. Eve cannot discriminate the state from her measurement in two-photon pulses. As a result, SARG04 generates a secret key from one-photon and twophoton pulses, whereas BB84 generates a secret key from one-photon pulses [23] .
In this letter, we report an experimental comparison of BB84 and SARG04 in the same QKD system. We implemented both protocols for several average photon numbers and quantum channel distances, and experimentally compared the secret key rates of BB84 and SARG04 protocols in the same QKD system.
Theory
Theoretically, the lower bounds of the secret key rates of BB84 ( )
at a given μ can be estimated from the quantum bit error rate (QBER, Q μ ) and the sifting rate (R μ ), the latter being defined as the ratio of sifted bits to the total number of Alice's raw bits.
The BB84 protocol is secure in the single-photon state and the lower bound of the secret key rate of BB84 is given as [24] 
where H denotes the Shannon entropy, R 1 is the sifting rate of single-photon states, and Q 1 is the QBER of single-photon states. R 1 and Q 1 of BB84 are constrained as
where
is the probability that a pulse consists of n photons. The minimum of the sifting rate of the single photon state is
, then r BB84 ⩽ 0, so Alice and Bob must abort the whole sifted key.
The SARG04 protocol can generate the secret key even when a pulse contains two photons, because Eve cannot get full information of Alice's key from the two-photon pulse [23] . From this fact, the lower bound of the secret key rate of SARG04 is [24] 
2 are Eve's uncertainty on the one-photon and two-photon pulses respectively [24, 25] , R 2 is the sifting rate of two-photon states, and Q 2 is the QBER of two-photon states. To be compatible with R μ and Q μ , R 1 , R 2 , Q 1 and Q 2 are constrained as [24] 
We can obtain R 1 min and Q 1 max of BB84 using equation (2) from the sifting rate and the QBER of BB84. Hence, we can estimate r BB84 L from the average photon number, the sifting rate and QBER of BB84. We can also estimate r SARG L using equations (3) and (4) from the experimental results.
Theoretically, the sifting rate and QBER are calculated from the average photon number and the QKD system parameters: such as, the dark-count rate, the transmittance of a quantum channel, and Bob's detection probability. Hence, we can also use equations (1)- (4) to calculate the theoretical secret key rate of BB84 and SARG04 in the QKD system [24] .
Experiments
To implement BB84 and SARG04 protocols, we built a fiberbased QKD system (figure 1). It consists of a transmitter (Alice), a receiver (Bob), a quantum channel that is a single mode fiber spool (attenuation coefficient is α = 3 dB km − 1 ) at 780 nm wavelength, and the public channel coaxial cables and the TCP/IP.
Alice's setup consists of a 780 nm pulsed diode laser (Coherent, CUBE 785-40C) that generates a train of 3 ns laser pulses at 1 MHz repetition rate, a variable attenuator, two highspeed Pockels cells (Leysop, RTP-3-20) for polarization encoding, and a personal computer with a PCI field-programmable gate array card (FPGA; National Instruments PCI-7813) and three delay generators. Polarization-encoded laser pulses are strongly attenuated by using neutral density filters (ND), so that μ < 1; the pulses are coupled into a fiber non-polarizing beam splitter (FBS), which splits the beam into two to allow checking of μ, and to allow launching to the quantum channel that is connected to Bob's setup. The polarization-encoded laser pulses are transmitted to Bob through a single-mode fiber. Note that the polarization transmission, via an optical fiber, requires efforts to keep the polarization stable; this can be done with a fiber polarization controller (FPC). In practical QKD systems, it can be achieved by active compensation techniques [26] .
Bob's setup consists of a 3 nm interference filter (IF), a 50/50 beam splitter for randomly selecting either Z basis (|V〉, |H〉) or X basis (|45°〉, | − 45°〉), four single-photon detectors, and a personal computer with two counter/timer (National Instruments PCI-6602). The single-photon detector has a detection efficiency (η det ) of ∼ 0.6 at 780 nm wavelength and dark-count probability (3.3 ± 0.6) × 10 − 5 . The efficiency of optical components is η opt = 0.72, so overall Bob's detection efficiency is η Bob = η opt η det ≈ 0.40.
BB84 and SARG04 use different methods to allow Alice and Bob to generate shared sifted keys. In the BB84 protocol they announce their basis information to each other. In SARG04, Alice sends her basis set information to Bob via TCP/IP; he uses this information to sift his raw keys to establish a set of shared sifted key bits. Bob informs Alice whether he got a conclusive result for each signal and Alice uses this information to sift her raw keys. After generating the sifted key, we estimate the secret key rate from the sifting rate and the QBER of Alice and Bob.
Results and discussion
BB84 and SARG04 protocols were implemented in the same QKD system, and their secret key rate, sifted key rate (figure 2) were compared when signals with a range of average photon numbers through 1.27 km of single-mode fiber. The measured protocol efficiency (ration of sifted bits to the number of raw bits received) was 0.50 ± 0.01 for BB84 and 0.25 ± 0.01 for SARG04; these agree closely with the theoretical efficiencies of 0.5 for BB84 and 0.25 for SARG04. For that reason, the sifted key rate of BB84 was always about double that of SARG04 when they had the same number of raw bits. The sifted key rates of both protocols increased as the average photon number increased, but the QBER (BB84 ∼ 3% ; SARG04 ∼ 5%) did not change much when the dark-count contributions were subtracted (not shown in figure 2 ). As is well known theoretically and experimentally, the QBER of BB84 (Q BB84 = (1 − V)/2) is about half that of SARG04 (Q SARG04 = (1 − V)/(2 − V) ≈ 1 − V) at the same visibility (V = 0.954) of the quantum channel [17, 27] .
We estimated the lower bound of the secret key rate from the sifted key rate and the QBER of BB84 and SARG04 (figure 2). The sifted key rate increased consistently as the average photon number increased, but the secret key rate was highest at μ ≈ 0.19 on both BB84 and SARG04. The secret key rate of SARG04 was less than half that of BB84, and both had zero secret key when the average photon number was higher than μ ≈ 0.3 in the 1.27 km (α = 3 dB km − 1 ) single-mode fiber. To investigate the secret key rate of BB84 and SARG04 according to distance, we implemented the BB84 and SARG04 protocols on a quantum channel for several fiber lengths ( figure 3 ). The measured optimal average photon number decreased as the distance of quantum channel increased. Theoretically, when α = 3 dB km − 1 , BB84 and SARG04 can generate the secret keys on our QKD system until 2.77 km and 2.44 km respectively. Although SARG04 is secure until the number of photons per pulse reaches two, and can generate more secret keys than BB84 under perfect quantum channel visibility and in particular situations [24] , we experimentally showed that BB84 generates more secret keys than SARG04. In the real world devices are imperfect, and the quantum channel visibility at which SARG04 is more sensitive than BB84 is less than one. Therefore, even if the probabiiity that SARG04 can generate more secret keys than BB84 is less than one [24] , BB84 is still more practical than SARG04 in the real world.
Conclusion
The BB84 and SARG04 QKD protocols were tested through single-mode fibers of different lengths. The setup was based on polarization encoding of an attenuated laser pulse. We checked the sifted key and the secret key rate according to average photon numbers per pulse in a fixed quantum channel distance. We found that BB84 is more suitable than SARG04 in the real world.
